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Climate Justice and Retrofitting for Energy Efficiency: Examples from the UK and 
China  
  
Elizabeth Brooks and Simin Davoudi 
 
Abstract 
 
Although sharing some common origins with environmental justice, in recent years, climate 
justice has emerged as a separate domain, one that entails both greater uncertainties and 
greater temporal and spatial distance between its causes in human activities and climatic 
shifts or extreme events. This article situates climate justice in relation to environmental 
justice and wider justice debates. It reflects on the multi-scalarity of climate justice and its bi-
dimensional character (the justice of adaptation and mitigation). It then explores three 
different variants of distributive justice – welfare, equity and equality distribution – through 
examples from both international climate negotiations and UK and China national energy 
efficiency retrofit policy. The article aims to illustrate the kinds of differences and problems 
that originate with three very different ways of interpreting the meaning of a just distribution 
of the benefits and burdens related to tackling human-origin climate change, and to show how 
these are in many cases being pitched against considerations of social justice. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Climate justice is concerned with the duties and rights that arise from the impacts of climate 
change. In this respect it can be compared with environmental justice, a concept that has 
developed to draw attention to the extent to which vulnerable communities are affected by 
human-induced environmental ills. This paper begins by looking at similarities and 
differences between environmental and climate justice, emphasising what is distinctive in the 
challenges for justice raised by climate change issues, in particular the long gaps in time and 
space between causes and effects and the cumulative nature of responsibility. It goes on to 
highlight the multi-dimensional nature of implementing justice for climate change, which 
must embrace international, national and local levels and must be differently articulated to 
address adaptation and mitigation measures. Such measures lead to both distributional costs 
and benefits for individuals, groups and nations and if unmonitored may lead to further 
entrenchment of injustices suffered by the already-disadvantaged. The remainder of the paper 
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is dedicated to bringing out the implications of three different interpretations of distributive 
justice –  welfare, equity and equality distribution – through applying them to climate 
mitigation efforts, first at the international level of emissions reduction negotiation and then 
at the national level of domestic retrofit for energy efficiency. It explores the different kinds 
of distributive justice effected by recent retrofit policies in the UK and China and concludes 
with a reflection on the trade-offs that seem inevitably to occur between climate change 
mitigation justice and social justice. 
 
2. What is climate justice? 
 
Climate change is undoubtedly the most visible and dramatic impact of the explosion in 
human population and activity over the last century, leading it to be described as ‘the canary 
in the coal mine’ for our species (Steffen, 2011, p.32).The recognition that the cumulative 
wastes of human industry can harm not just other species, but other humans, has historically 
been subject to frequent instances of denial and repression. This is highlighted through the 
history of the environmental justice movement (EJM), which has tackled the higher-than-
expected siting and/or impacts of polluting activities within ethnic minority and socially 
deprived communities. More recently environmental justice has looked at the siting of 
environmental benefits as well as hazards and at its co-location with a host of other 
vulnerabilities besides socio-economic deprivation (Davoudi and Brooks, 2012). The 
problems encountered by the EJM in establishing responsibility have also sometimes lain in 
the fact of ‘teleconnectivity’ or ‘flows’ − whereby air and water transmit polluting wastes at 
some distance from their point of origin, in both space and time (Chase, Pielke and Avissar, 
2007), making it hard to link a source of contamination with its health impacts.  
 
A further problem with allocating responsibility is that the very industries that contaminated 
land and water, and destroyed livelihoods, were simultaneously providing jobs and incomes. 
In other words, an activity that had enhanced social justice by increasing the availability of 
paid employment in a locality was at the same time inflicting an environmental injustice on 
the people using the land and/or water there. These problems addressed through the concept 
of environmental justice seem broadly similar to the problems encountered in climate change 
justice. The latter shifts the focus from the ground, water and air that people need, to the 
upper atmosphere, where pollution engenders both gradual climate shifts and more extreme 
climate events, often at a considerable distance in time and space from the pollution’s source. 
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Comparable with the findings in environmental justice studies, those people worst affected by 
the changes in the upper atmosphere generally live in the most deprived countries, and are 
often dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, one of the highly climate-dependent 
sectors.  
 
While there are further commonalities between the two approaches, such as sharing common 
origins at grass-roots level (Bond, 2012), there are also several important differences between 
climate and environmental justice that have implications for the way climate justice is 
pursued. With environmental injustices, it should be possible to adjudicate on the actions of a 
corporation or authority in creating a polluting industry in a particular community; for 
example, through demanding that it mitigate its impacts, or compensate its victims. But with 
climate injustices, it is harder to say exactly who may be responsible. This is because the 
latter result from the cumulative actions of many disparate actors, and furthermore, events 
that are simply the result of climate variation cannot always be clearly distinguished from 
those that have been caused by human-generated climate change. The victims of both tend to 
be the same groups of disadvantaged people (Baer, 2011, p331), but while in the first case, 
the cause is an ‘Act of God’, in the second case, human agents bear the responsibility.  
 
This raises the question of the level at which human responsibility lies: with individuals, 
groups, nations, or indeed systems of production and consumption? Some would suggest that 
climate change is mainly caused by high-emitting individuals or social groups; along these 
lines one recent study found that reducing the carbon emissions of the richest 1/6
th
 of the 
world’s population could, by 2030, bring down global emissions by 50% (Chakravarty et al., 
2009). But high-emitters can also be low-income and disadvantaged people (Baer, 2011, 
p329); for example, those with energy inefficient older homes or for whom high city rents 
have enforced long work commutes. Can we say that they are more responsible for emissions, 
just because they cannot afford a more sustainable lifestyle? If, by contrast, we lay the fault 
with high-emitting industries which operate unnecessarily polluting activities, can we 
exonerate the state in which their operations are based and which either does not legislate or 
fails to implement legislation against emissions?  
 
Many would regard the state as the responsible party, both in allowing polluting activity to 
happen and in drawing benefit from it through various forms of taxation. Yet states do not 
have a perfectly free choice in setting mitigation policy in a globalised economy: 
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{…] global economic interdependence sets limits on the degree to which climate 
[change mitigation] leaders can continue to ratchet up their carbon constraints and 
remain competitive, without risking the migration of industry, and hence ‘carbon 
leakage’, to jurisdictions with weaker climate policies. (Baer, 2011, p443). 
 
A further point relates to intergenerational climate justice, that is, while these difficulties 
concern current emitters, much of the global warming we live with today is said to be caused 
by historic emissions, dating back to the dawn of the industrial revolution in the 1750s 
(IPCC, 2007). Judged by emissions alone, the early-industrialising nations bear greater 
responsibility, but it is difficult to stand by this if we take into account that people’s 
awareness of the long-term impacts of industry only came much later, among the distant 
descendants of the original emitters. As a way forward, it has been suggested that we might 
with more validity date the beginning of historical responsibility to some point in the 1980s, 
when states generally began to recognise the impacts of emissions on climate (Bell, 2011, 
p.35). If this is the case, most of us alive today bear far greater responsibility for future 
change than did our forebears. 
 
Arising from these kinds of debates, there is growing consensus that climate justice must be 
viewed as multi-scalar, operating from the international down through the national, 
community and individual scales, with a corresponding spread of rights and duties at different 
levels.  Another factor which has implications for the kinds of rights and duties extrapolated 
is that climate change policy is strongly bi-dimensional. This is because it has become 
increasingly clear that emissions are reaching dangerous levels and a point of no return 
(IPCC, 2013), and thus rather than solely focusing on mitigating climate change, there is a 
necessity to adapt to climate change as well. Justice in both mitigation and adaptation policies 
entails the rights of the victims, and the duties of reducing impacts on them, as well as the 
duty to ensure that any interventions do not further entrench existing inequalities, and that 
any benefits that may arise from interventions are fairly distributed (Fussel, 2010; Pavola and 
Adger, 2006). 
 
Mitigation justice is, however, also focused on the perpetrators who create greenhouse gas 
emissions in going about their daily business and who must somehow be persuaded to curtail 
those emissions. Curtailing emissions of course carries with it economic costs as well as risks 
of free-riding by the non-compliant; individuals and communities may find few incentives to 
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engage in mitigation beyond the demands of conscience and the behavioural driver of 
conforming to (what is currently) a relatively weak social norm. 
 
Thus, it is nations rather than individuals and communities who are seen as the most 
efficacious organisations to bring about climate change mitigation; mitigation justice has 
therefore tended to be worked out first and foremost between nation-states. In particular, 
mitigation negotiations have focused on the international scale (Bulkeley et al., 2013), due to 
the question of the global flows of air and sea, and to corresponding geographical distances 
between victims and perpetrators of climate harms. Following on international agreements, 
mitigation must then be rolled out at national and local level. Deciding how to distribute this 
responsibility fairly between nations, groups and individuals is the purpose of the distributive 
justice of climate change mitigation, which this paper now explores in more detail. The 
purpose is not to provide a full account of the justice of climate change mitigation within 
international politics or national policies, but rather to highlight how at every level, there 
come into play quite divergent interpretations of what constitutes a just distribution; and to 
bring out some inherent tensions between climate and social justice. Understanding these 
factors enables a clearer recognition of the trade-offs, winners and losers, in every climate 
mitigation initiative, whatever the scale. 
 
3. Distributive justice and climate change mitigation on a global scale 
 
Both debate and policy consideration of climate change justice have tended to focus on 
distribution, and there is some evidence that although procedural justice has also featured, at 
least in policy, this is more developed with regard to adaptation than mitigation (Bulkeley et 
al., 2013). There are several different ways to approach a just distribution. One way of 
simplifying the issues is to break distributive justice down into three types: welfare 
distribution, equity distribution and equality distribution (Buttram et al., 1995). Put simply, a 
welfare distribution, reflecting Rawls’ ‘difference principle’, means more resources are 
allocated to those in greatest need; equity distribution relies on the idea of ‘just deserts’, 
meaning more benefits are received by those making greater contributions (and vice versa); 
and equality distribution means giving everyone the same thing regardless of either their 
contribution or need (Davoudi, 2013; Davoudi and Brooks, 2014f).  
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Welfare distribution is exemplified in Annexe II of the Kyoto Protocol which tasks OECD 
countries (as at 1992) with giving help to the most vulnerable nations to reduce emissions and 
adapt to the impacts of a changing climate (UNFCCC, 2013). Welfare justice can be aligned 
with the mainstream liberal theory of social justice, and in broader terms, implies that the last 
and most vulnerable should be given the first place to ensure progressive redistribution of 
benefits (Pavola and Adger, 2006). By contrast, an example of equity distribution is shown 
by the ‘polluter pays’ principle, whereby the focus is on making those who cause major 
emissions liable for the costs of cleaning them up and/or abating them. This includes 
historical emissions, for which developed countries have far greater responsibility than 
developing ones (Gardiner, 2011, 315). 
 
On a global scale of climate change policy, a distribution based on equality is manifested in 
the suggestion that all people, in every nation, should be allowed the same level of per capita 
emissions (Richardson et al., cited in Steffen, 2011, p24). As a starting point for international 
negotiations, the equality distribution approach, in terms of proposals for a per capita annual 
allowance of CO2 has considerable value in redressing the emissions balance between the 
richest and poorest nations, as well allowing consideration of population size in setting the 
level at which each nation’s emissions should be capped. However, setting the same cap for 
each country might seem to ignore the fact that, while a developing country (China) is the 
biggest-emitting nation in the world today (Schreurs, 2011), it is the developed countries that 
have contributed the most emissions historically – an estimated 29% from the USA, 26% 
from the nations of the EU, and just 8% from China. Equally, while the average income in the 
US and UK in 2007 was $45,000 per annum, in China, it was just $2,604 per annum 
(Gardiner, 2011, p315). Thus, for a citizen of the UK and of China to be set the same 
emissions cap both ignores the greater relative historical contribution of the UK citizen and 
their current greater personal resources. Furthermore the emissions rates of the US, UK and 
the rest of the developed world are already considerably lower than they might have been, 
due to the outsourcing of their energy-intensive manufacturing to the developing world 
‘while their affluent consumer lifestyles have been sustained or enhanced’ (Christoff and 
Eckersley, 2011). This would be an argument for setting per capita allowances higher in 
China than in the US. However, it is worth noting that that such off-shoring is not without its 
benefits to the developing world, where it creates jobs and contributes to economic growth.  
Equally, a per capita emissions target takes population numbers at face value and thus fails to 
give proper recognition to the contribution to mitigation made by China’s ‘one child’ policy, 
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which has been in operation for over three decades, and clearly contributed to arresting 
population growth and its attendant emissions increases over that period
1
 (PRC National 
Climate Change Program, cited in Schreurs, 2011, p453; Symons, 2011, p.87).  
 
In practice, since China’s per capita emissions were recently only a quarter of US levels, a 
per capita emissions allowance would be likely to work in China’s favour, by raising what is 
allowed for each citizen (Baer, 2011). In its international dealings, however, China has not 
pursued this approach to the distributive justice of mitigation. Instead it has subscribed to a 
combination of ‘welfare’ (need-based) distribution and ‘equity’ (desert-based) distribution of 
emissions. In line with the welfare approach, China is treated in the Kyoto protocol as a 
developing country and thus, based on its need to pursue high levels of growth to raise its 
population out of poverty, it sets its targets in terms of reducing energy consumption per unit 
of GDP, a measure known as ‘energy intensity’ (Harris, 2011). This means in effect that it 
may continue to increase emissions as long as these are decreasing in relation to its GDP.  
 
The ‘equity distribution’ element arises because through its efforts to reduce its energy 
intensity, China has been extremely active in developing a green economy and rolling out 
emissions reduction policies at all levels of government (ibid.; Schreurs, 2011). While 
China’s energy consumption has been increasing with its growth rate, the fact that the former 
is considerably lower than the latter is attributed to the success of energy strategies from the 
rolling series of five year energy efficiency plans (Price et al., 2012). China’s historic and 
actual commitment to a large state apparatus (Jacques, 2009) may mean such planning is 
more achievable than in a context such as the UK or US, where there are both political and 
austerity-induced pressures to keep the role of the state to a minimum. Although, in this 
context, it is interesting to note that Australia and Canada are among the weakest of the 
developed countries in terms of their energy intensity, besides having the poorest 
performance against Kyoto targets and the strongest increase in per capita and aggregate 
emissions of both developed and developing countries (Christoff and Eckersley, 2011).  
 
China has adopted a ‘polluter pays’ position, investing in a wide range of programmes to 
mitigate its own emissions with far more commitment and efficacy than has been shown by 
many comparable developing and developed countries; it is probably due to the sheer scale of 
                                                          
1
Although the ‘one child’ policy was recently rescinded in response to China’s ageing demographic. 
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the country and its emissions that this proactive commitment to ‘equity’ climate justice 
generally fails to get the recognition it deserves.  
 
In the next section we will turn to domestic energy efficiency retrofit and examine how these 
different kinds of distribution are combined to further or hinder climate and social justice at a 
national level. 
 
4. Different types of distributive justice and energy efficiency retrofit at national scale 
 
Welfare 
Welfare distribution in climate change mitigation at the domestic level would imply that it is 
those who are in the greatest need who should receive the most support. However, the 
concept of ‘need’ is not self-evident with regard to energy efficiency retrofit – does it imply 
financial need or heating need – or a combination of both? The Warm Front policy (as it was 
called in England – similar policies with different names were rolled out in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland), ran from 2004-2012, and gave government grants to low-income and 
vulnerable private tenants and home owners to improve the energy efficiency of their homes. 
In the case of social housing tenants, grants were given to the social housing associations 
under the parallel Decent Homes initiative, one of whose objectives was to raise all social 
housing to minimum standards of thermal comfort.  
 
To be eligible for Warm Front grants, people were judged against various criteria used as a 
proxy for need, including being in receipt of specified benefits and credits, being disabled, 
aged over 60, or  with a young family. These groups were given grants, subsidies and 
practical support to arrange for the retrofit of their homes up to a value of £3,500. The main 
purpose of the grants was to raise households out of fuel poverty (defined as spending more 
than 10% of income on heating), rather than to lower their emissions, although the latter 
might be supposed a side-effect of improving domestic energy efficiency. Unfortunately, 
because people’s income and the existing thermal requirements of their homes were not taken 
into account, this policy was unsuccessful in reaching those most in need (NAO, 2009; Hills, 
2012). Nevertheless, it did manage to significantly increase the thermal efficiency of millions 
of homes through, for example, cavity wall insulation (DECC, 2011). 
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A thermal, rather than financial interpretation of greatest ‘need’ might, however, be equally 
appropriate to large countries with significant discrepancies in climate between different 
geographical regions. This would suggest a welfare distribution of support for energy 
efficiency retrofit based on location, rather than, or in conjunction with, income. Such a 
distribution would be relevant to China: while there is an approximately 5 degree difference 
in yearly average temperature between the UK’s coldest and hottest places (Shetland Islands 
compared with St Helier, Jersey); in China, the difference can be as much as 25 degrees 
(Hailar in Inner Mongolia compared with Haikou on Hainan Island). This can explain why an 
aspect of China’s mitigation retrofit policy seems to conform to this second interpretation of 
what mitigation ‘need’ entails in welfare distribution. The 11th five-year plan (2006-10) for 
energy savings and emissions reduction sought to reduce ‘heat intensity’ – heating used per 
metre square – by 50% by 2010. It had three policy tools to effect this change: energy price 
control, heat meter installation, and financial incentives to retrofit for energy efficiency in the 
country’s cold and severe cold zones (two of the country’s five defined thermal zones). The 
rate set for the severe cold zone was 5 RMB (or Yuan) per m
2
 higher than that for the cold 
zone; both rates were set low, coming to around 15% the cost of the retrofit per square metre 
(Price et al., 2012).  
 
Unlike in the UK, the goal was set in terms of reducing ‘heat intensity’ (defined as heating 
used per metre square) rather than in terms of creating an overall financial saving for the 
consumer. According to Price et al. (2012), the early indications were that the scheme has 
low uptake because the subsidy for retrofitting per metre square was set too low, so residents 
would have to find a large proportion of the costs of retrofit themselves. In practice they were 
keener to adopt another option offered by the government, in terms of installing heat 
metering (Price et al., 2012, p.2170).  A particular problem with the welfare approach to 
mitigation distribution, targeting those in greatest need, is that, by definition of being in need 
− either because they cannot afford enough energy or because cold conditions mean they 
need a great deal of it − they will seek to improve their conditions when the opportunity 
arises. So a welfare policy that helps those most in need with energy efficiency retrofit may 
allow them to increase their energy consumption to attain thermal comfort. This is an 
example of the so-called the ‘take back’ or ‘rebound’ effect, first identified by Jevons in the 
19
th
 century. It means that improved energy efficiency can actually result in increased energy 
use, as energy costs come down and people spend more on energy and/or other goods (see 
Davoudi, Dilley and Crawford, this issue).  
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‘Rebound’ may be seen to represent a gain for social justice when it applies to low-income 
beneficiaries, who have been unable to afford thermal comfort in their homes prior to retrofit, 
but it can also be a loss for climate change mitigation. Furthermore, any consumer, not just 
the most needy, may be susceptible to ‘rebound’ subsequent to the efficiencies of retrofit, in 
terms of more electricity hungry gadgets, and/or more frequent use of energy-consuming 
services, such as clothes and dishwashing machines. This suggests that, as in the Chinese 
government’s recent retrofit policy explained earlier, it is appropriate to supplement financial 
incentives to retrofit with interventions to modify consumer behaviour, such as metering and 
energy pricing control, if more energy-efficient homes are not to result in greater overall 
domestic energy use (Lin et al., 2013). 
However, in the current UK context, rebound is unlikely to present a major problem, such is 
the regularity of major rises in energy costs, due at least in part to deregulation of the industry 
and the lack of transparency in its pricing policies (Which, 2013), as discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
Equity 
The ‘equity’ form of distributive justice might operate in two, related, ways in climate change 
mitigation at the domestic level. In its positive form, it would imply greater rewards to the 
‘deserving’ individuals who make the greatest contributions to society, in terms of reducing 
their emissions. In its negative version, it would imply, as we have seen earlier, that the 
‘polluter pays’ – the person with bigger emissions must accept the financial costs of reducing 
them. Both are potential consequences of a current UK domestic emissions mitigation policy 
called ‘Green Deal’. This is the successor policy to ‘Warm Front’, described in the previous 
subsection, and is the flagship policy for retrofitting. Both Warm Front and Green Deal are in 
fact complex and multi-faceted groups of policies, providing support for a wide range of 
domestic retrofit interventions in forms that include grants, vouchers, loans and Feed in 
Tariffs to those fitting their homes with energy efficiency measures of various kinds (Dilley, 
2012: 71-4).   
 
The central component of Green Deal is a government loan for retrofit interventions, which 
seems more likely to be taken up among owner occupiers than private tenants (other 
provisions exist for social housing), as retrofitting loans would be taken out by landlords but 
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energy savings made by tenants.
2
 The fact that those on higher incomes generally consume 
more energy (Summerfield et al., 2010; Druckman et al., 2008), and so pay more in terms of 
higher fuel bills, provides a face-value incentive for them to explore the potential for 
reducing their domestic energy consumption through a Green Deal assessment (for which 
they must, at the time of writing, pay around £120). If they are satisfied from the assessment 
that the savings will be worth more to them than the cost of the retrofit, they can secure a 
government loan for the work, which is then directly deducted from their energy bill in small 
instalments. This seems to fit an equity perspective, whereby the greater people’s 
contributions to domestic emissions mitigation, the greater should be their financial reward.  
 
However, although a condition of Green Deal funding is that the intervention should cost less 
than the anticipated savings, importantly, this is not guaranteed. In the context of rapidly 
rising costs of energy in the UK, those who take up Green Deal may continue to see their 
bills rise; it is just that this will be to a lesser extent than would have been the case had they 
not invested in the energy efficiency retrofit. Thus, they will not always recoup the costs of 
the retrofit intervention – a case where the polluter pays principle comes into effect, and they 
have been obliged to pay more to emit less, with no net benefit. It appears that there is little 
financial incentive for individual householders to subscribe to this kind of distributive justice, 
particularly when it is safe to assume that for each one who chooses to ‘do the right thing’, 
many others will act purely on the basis of economic self-interest – the problem of free-
riding. 
 
Pre-existing the Green Deal but now eligible to be funded by it is the installation of domestic 
renewable energy generation, which is rewarded through the payment to the householder of a 
Feed-In-Tariff (FIT). The FIT is set by energy companies at an advantageous rate (fixed over 
long time period) for each unit of electricity households generate from domestic renewables, 
such as photovoltaic panels. Here the rewards are significant and their benefits self-evident. 
These kinds of Green Deal loans favour the owners of larger properties, because eligibility 
                                                          
2 This is because, in the UK, apart from some student lets, most private tenants pay their own energy costs 
separate from the rent. So, while tenants benefit from more energy efficient buildings, it is the landlords who 
decide whether to pay to make the changes. The Green Deal aims to tackle this split incentive. According to 
the Government Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011:37), “from 2016, domestic private landlords will not be able 
unreasonably to refuse their tenants’ requests for consent to energy efficiency improvements”. However, 
enforecement will be conditional on “there being no net or upfront costs to landlords”. 
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for such technologies demands a larger space, for example, solar panels, which need a large 
roof-space to generate sufficient energy, and geothermal systems, which require an adequate-
sized outdoor area for installation. 
 
This is a case where, in line with equity principles, investment in emissions mitigation 
receives a quite substantial reward, particularly for those early-subscribers to the scheme, 
able to continue to benefit from the original high-set rates. However, somewhat countering 
the equity distribution of FIT, costs for this reward are then passed back by the energy 
companies to the consumer in the form of a surcharge raised on the energy generated from 
this source that has led to higher energy bills for all (Dilley, 2012). By contrast with Warm 
Front, Green Deal is not directed at low income and vulnerable households (this is the 
province of the accompanying policy, Energy Companies Obligation; see next section). 
While lacking in social justice aims compared with Warm Front, it has a potentially stronger 
climate justice impact, due to the fact that it is more likely to appeal to those on the higher 
emissions end of the scale. But in practice, the combination of continued strong rises in the 
consumer costs of energy, and historically low interest rates on loans means that mitigation 
gains are unlikely because there simply is not a strong enough incentive to encourage uptake.  
 
Thus, although more than 70,000 have used a government-backed Green Deal assessment of 
how much energy they could save through retrofit, actual uptake of the government loan 
scheme since it began in January 2013 has been extremely low – 12 households as of end 
August 2013 (Meyer 2013).The explanation seems to lie in the discrepancy between the 
interest rate offered by the government and rates homeowners can leverage from their own 
mortgages. The Green Deal loan interest rate is at around 7%, the market rate for an 
unsecured loan, but because retrofit can be financed in most cases by extending a mortgage, 
at the time of writing, considerably lower than this rate, there is ultimately little incentive for 
the kinds of people who will benefit from Green Deal to actually use the government scheme.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that, on the domestic scale, an equity version of distributive 
justice underlies the current UK domestic retrofit policy, as, at least in theory, those who 
make greater contributions to mitigating emissions are also those who can make greater 
financial savings from domestic retrofit. However, as the popular rejection of the Green Deal 
loans scheme has shown, the reality is more complex, including the context of energy prices, 
loan prices, personal ethics and social norms. Unfortunately, as the vast majority of those 
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paying for a Green Deal assessment did not take up the government Green Deal loans, no 
further information is available on their actions, so the ultimate mitigations impact of Green 
Deal is unknowable. Furthermore, the fact that the cost of at least some of the rewards 
provided for Green Deal retrofit interventions is levied from all energy users alike suggests 
that, whatever its superior potential benefits for climate justice, implementing equity 
distributions in this way may have regressive implications for social justice.  
 
Equality 
An equality distribution with regard to the costs of energy efficiency retrofit is the largely 
unacknowledged side-effect of a pendant policy to Green Deal, which shifts focus from 
individual householder initiatives to greening the energy industry in line with emissions 
reductions targets. This is the Energy Companies Obligation (ECO) scheme, a separate 
initiative running alongside Green Deal, which places legal obligations on the larger energy 
suppliers to deliver energy efficiency measures to domestic users. This includes the Carbon 
Emissions Reduction Obligation, the Community Obligation and the Home Heating Cost 
Reduction (‘Affordable Warmth’) Obligation (Ofgem, 2014). In continuation with earlier 
schemes EEC and CERT, these schemes oblige energy companies to help their customers 
achieve energy efficiency, in particular those customers who meet qualifying criteria for 
being in a vulnerable or low income category. The costs for all these schemes are passed back 
to customers through general price rises in the cost of energy (DECC, 2011:37).  
 
Among this raft of ECO policies, the ‘Affordable Warmth’ Obligation, stands out in that it is 
not even targeted at the low income and vulnerable, but yet the costs are spread equally 
among all energy users (as for all ECO initiatives, as explained above). Affordable Warmth 
covers those homes that do not meet the Green Deal rule; that is, the project will cost less 
than the financial savings that can be estimated to accrue from it. This is expected to support, 
for example, owners of houses with stone walls which are common in the UK’s rural areas 
and notoriously costly to insulate. This obligation alone is expected to cost £1.3 billion to the 
energy companies, which will be recouped through price rises for all energy consumers 
equally. Low income households use less energy for heating, but spend proportionately more 
of their income on it, so in effect, they are bearing a disproportionate amount of these costs 
(Dilley, 2012) and in the case of Affordable Warmth, not subsidising only other low income 
households to make energy efficiency improvements, but owners of what are often attractive 
and high-value period properties, that happen to be built from stone.  
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This takes place in a context where privatised and deregulated energy companies are able to 
continually raise prices at levels high above the rate of inflation, with a lack of transparency 
about how this might relate to actual increases in supply costs (Which 2013). Outcries over 
the ever-rising expense of domestic energy have prompted the Coalition government to take 
steps in 2014 to move the costs of the ECO from the energy companies back to general 
taxation, although at the time of writing it is unclear precisely when and how this will be 
brought into effect. Broadly speaking, this could be seen as retrenching from an equality to an 
equity distribution of the costs of mitigation, given that higher energy use is associated with 
higher earnings and thus greater taxation, so “the polluter pays”.  It may represent a better 
trade-off between social and climate justice than the original ECO policy, but of course this is 
in turn dependent on the generally progressive nature of UK taxation.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has reviewed the idea of climate change justice, and whether it should be viewed 
as an extension of environmental justice. We have argued that while there are some overlaps, 
climate change presents a distinct set of challenges to justice due to the following factors: a) 
difficulties in distinguishing whether an event results from climate change or normal climate 
variation b) difficulties in tracing back climate shift or events to a source, and questions over 
where responsibility lies – at the level of the individual, groups, state or the international 
community c) the difference between the mitigation and adaptation aspects of climate 
change, which imply different sets of right and duty holders (who may also, due to 
teleconnectivity, be located in disparate parts of the globe).  
 
Focusing on the justice of climate change mitigation, we discussed that, due to 
teleconnectivity, climate change mitigation policy is first and foremost worked out at an 
international scale, between nation states. Agreements and positions developed at the 
international scale are then rolled out at lower national and local levels, often informed by the 
form of justice that concerns the distribution of burdens and benefits. We also illustrated how 
the three main subtypes of distributional justice ─ equality, equity and welfare distributions ─ 
may play out in the context of climate change mitigation by drawing on different examples 
from the various scales of mitigation initiative. This shows that, in practice, more than one 
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type of distributional justice may inform a country’s position and that trade-offs are made 
between social and climate justice.  
 
While in the short term, high and increasing energy price rises in the UK may act as a greater 
stay on national emissions than might result from the effective implementation of energy 
efficiency retrofit, in the longer term the cost of energy combined with a failure to step up 
retrofit efforts is likely to aggravate the existing social injustices of fuel poverty and excess 
winter deaths (Hills 2012). This suggests the need for a balance between climate justice and 
social justice that in current circumstances can only be achieved through the state resuming 
its greater role in supporting low income and vulnerable people to achieve energy efficiency 
retrofit, drawing on the revenues from the current progressive system of taxation (one that 
takes proportionately more from those who earn more). 
 
In this regard, China, with its historical and actual commitment to a large state sector, seems 
to offer more promise in delivering climate change mitigation justice by being able to 
incrementally fine-tune its five-year plans for energy efficiency to create effective policies 
through a mixture of behaviour change, retrofit and price control. Nevertheless, it should be 
borne in mind that, as noted elsewhere in this issue, whatever China’s success in reducing its 
energy intensity through domestic retrofit, the embodied energy lost in its vast reconstruction 
programme which is largely needed to accommodate rapid urbanisation (Chen, 2011), is 
likely to outweigh all gains. Thus on the domestic as well as the international scale, 
considerations of social justice – providing more of the population with the opportunity of 
urban dwelling with attendant higher incomes –  continue to outweigh those of climate 
justice. Furthermore, the extent to which social justice is the main motivation for economic 
growth remains an open question.  
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